Case Caption: Ocean Pest et al v. Rebelly et alCase Number: SCT-CIV-2025-0019Date: 03/23/2026Author: Hodge, Rhys S. Citation: 2026 VI 5Summary: In an appeal from an order granting enforcement of a mediated settlement agreement, the judgment is reversed. In a tort claim, court-ordered mediation took place in 2024. After seven hours of discussion, the terms of a settlement agreement were read in writing and confirmed in an email. Neither the mediator nor counsel for any of the parties filed a notice with the Superior Court that an agreement had been reached. The Superior Court determined that the elements of an enforceable contract—“offer, acceptance of that offer, and consideration”—were satisfied based on the emails between the parties’ counsels and the mediator, and that Attorney Sheesley possessed the authority to bind the plaintiffs to the terms of that contract since he acted with actual or apparent authority as their agent. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court reverses, noting that “[a] substantive rule of law . . . creates and defines the rights, duties, and obligations that are subsequently administered by procedural rules of law,” whereas “[a] procedural rule regulates the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.” The instant case raises a novel issue: what law prevails if a conflict arises between a procedural court rule adopted by this Court through the rule-making process and a substantive common law doctrine created by this Court through ordinary adjudication? Here, it is readily apparent from the plain text of Civil Rule 90 that this Court did not intend to displace the common law of contracts. In fact, there is no conflict between the rule and the common law at all Civil Rule 90, by its own clear and unambiguous language, applies only to court-ordered mediation in civil cases pending in the Superior Court. It does not purport to govern all agreements, or even all agreements arising from mediation. But even more importantly, Civil Rule 90 does not purport to change the common-law requirements for entering into a valid contract. Civil Rule 90 is clear: if the parties enter into a written agreement signed by the parties and their counsel and notify the Superior Court in accordance with Civil Rule 90(h)(2), then the Superior Court may exercise authority to enforce that agreement as part of the same civil action if a party breaches it or fails to perform. In this appeal it is concluded that the Superior Court erred in disregarding Civil Rule 90 and analyzing the defendants’ motion only through the lens of the common law of contracts. At this stage, the question is not one of whether the parties entered into an enforceable contract or agreement, but whether the Superior Court possessed the authority to enforce such an agreement as part of the existing civil case without any of the parties seeking and receiving leave to amend their pleadings to assert a claim or defense based on such agreement. While the common law of contracts may inform whether the parties entered into an agreement, the Superior Court lacks enforcement authority under Civil Rule 90(h)(3) unless the agreement also satisfies the additional formalities required by Civil Rule 90(h)(2). The agreement—if any—reached at the mediation does not satisfy the requirements of Civil Rule 90(h)(2), and the Superior Court consequently lacked authority to enforce it under Civil Rule 90(h)(3). This does not constitute a holding by this Court that the parties did not enter into an enforceable settlement agreement at the mediation; it only means that the defendants cannot enforce such an agreement as part of the underlying civil action and without amending their pleadings, but must instead do so by initiating a new case in the Superior Court—and even then, they may prove their case only through
respecting the privileges codified in Civil Rules 90(d)(8)-(9). Accordingly, the March 4, 2025 dismissal order is vacated and the plaintiffs’ complaint and defendants’ counterclaims are reinstated. While sanctions pursuant to Civil Rule 90(h)(3) are not warranted because the parties’ failure to comply with Civil Rule 90(h)(2) precludes the Superior Court from exercising its enforcement authority under Civil Rule 90(h)(3), it appears that Vasaturo’s conduct might warrant mandatory, non-discretionary sanctions under Civil Rule 90(f)(2). Therefore, in addition to ordering the reinstatement of the plaintiffs’ claims and defendants’ counterclaims, we direct the Superior Court on remand to determine whether to assess against Vasaturo the mandatory sanctions called for in Civil Rule 90(f)(2).Attachment: Open Document or Opinion