Case Caption: Penn Jr., vs. People of the VICase Number: SCT-CRIM-2023-0122Date: 05/08/2026Author: Form Field 42Swan, Ive Arlington Citation: 2026 VI 6Summary: The Superior Court’s order denying appellant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial is affirmed. Appellant was arrested in 2018 for allegedly engaging in sexual intercourse with his minor stepdaughter when she was between 12 and 18 years old. On October 17, 2022, the People re-filed the criminal charges against this defendant in a ten count information and commenced a new criminal case. On August 11, 2023, the People presented the defendant with a conditional plea offer on a charge of unlawful sexual contact, count eight of the information, and the People would recommend a prison sentence of 15 years, in addition to other conditions. Defendant endorsed the conditional plea agreement, which preserved appellate review of the Superior Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the case for lack of a speedy trial. Three days later defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, which Superior Court denied in the June 17, 2023 order now on appeal, in which it concluded that the delay between defendant’s arrest in October 2022 and the trial date scheduled for September 2023 was not presumptively prejudicial. Applying all the factors established in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the Superior Court concluded that although this defendant asserted his rights to a speedy trial in a motion before the court, none of the other Barker factors were met; therefore, there was ultimately no prejudice to the defendant. This appeal followed. It is here held that, for purposes of the first Barker factor, the Speedy Trial period begins to run with the first arrest or information, whichever is earlier. The period is then tolled when the prosecution dismisses the charges nolle prosequi, and the period resumes running with the second arrest or information on charges that are the same or otherwise vary only in the addition of lesser included charges stemming from the same criminal incident. Here it is agreed that the length of delay in both cases lodged against this defendant, totaling four years, should be combined. Accordingly the length of delay here is presumptively prejudicial, and the right to speedy trial was asserted in this case back in 2022. However, the remaining Barker factors outweigh the presumption of prejudice. The Court here notes that the reason for delay here was that the victim witness was serving abroad in the United States Military, thus the delay was not attributable to the People. The final cognizable factor requires consideration whether defendant suffered undue prejudice due to a speedy trial rights violations. Considering the three applicable factors the right to speedy trial is intended to protect, the Court concludes here that the defendant failed to demonstrate additional particularized prejudice but instead relies in conclusory arguments that are insufficient and underdeveloped, such that his claim of prejudice is waived pursuant to Rule 22(m). Accordingly the Superior Court’s order denying his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial is affirmed.Attachment: Open Document or Opinion